Media & Military

The media and the military ... and unlikely couple in the eyes of some and mortal enemies in others. After the events of 9.11 my loyalties were tested.
As a journalism student I was often dragged into debates over the right to know about military movements or "the whole story". As a public relations/photographer for the ROTC I often listen to cadets cries of biased reporting of the War and the increasing negativity against it.
The debates and questions began to subside, but my interest in the relationship between the two was increasing.
I first began to look at specific relations between to two such the Vietnam era. My favorite right away was the Pentagon Papers Case of 1971. This interest led me to write a paper on the topic for a journalism independent study.
This past fall I began working on my masters (liberal art in military history) and again took up the research working on expanding on the paper.
Here is a summary so far:

A look at the Media and National Security through The Pentagon Papers Case of 1971
The Pentagon Papers Case of 1971 was an important case in the history of the media industry, challenging both the legal and ethical boundaries of the press. It set forth to question the rights of the public to know what their elected officials are doing on their behalf versus the what should remain confidential based on the
interest of national security.
The case of the Pentagon Papers hinged on the activity of two men, Robert McNamara and Daniel Ellsberg.
There would have been no Pentagon Papers but for Robert McNamara and there would have been no leak of the papers but for Daniel Ellsberg. (Rudenstine, 1996)
Both men began the decade [of the 1960's] as strong advocates of American policy and with deep conviction that American goals were worthy and attainable. Both advocated and supported the war. Both were involved in the historical study that became know as the Pentagon Papers. (Rudenstine, 1996)
As the decade of the 1960's wore on, it was apparent that the lives of these two men would be tied inextricably with the Vietnam War. (Rudenstine, 1996)
Robert McNamara, newly appointed president of Ford Motor Company, was asked by president-elect John F. Kennedy to become his secretary of defense in 1961 where he served until 1968.
McNamara did not think he was qualified, but agreed under the condition that he be left to run the department as he thought best and to appoint whomever he wanted. (Rudenstine, 1996)
By early 1962, McNamara had emerged as the dominant policy strategist for Vietnam within the Kennedy administration. McNamara was determined to exercise an influential hand in shaping Vietnam policy. In the end, he was so influential that the war in Vietnam eventually became known as McNamara's War. (Rudenstine, 1996)
McNamara served in the office as secretary of defense for seven years, until his resignation in February, 1968, during the administration of president Lyndon B. Johnson.
President Lyndon B. Johnson must have felt confident that Robert McNamara would remain loyally quiet and not publicly criticize the administration's Vietnam War policies once he left the government. Rudenstine, 1996)
Johnson was unaware of the three dozen analysts who were compiling information regarding the secret history of America's involvement of the United State's involvement in the war, after McNamara's departure. The 7,000 page project was complied within a year, although McNamara himself did not speak up until
1995.
The document was named "History of the U.S. Decision-making Process on Vietnam Policy, 1947-1967," but came to be know as the Pentagon Papers. It was classified as "Top Secret-Sensitive" due to its contents.
The precise reasons McNamara commissioned the Pentagon Papers remain uncertain and continue to be a subject of controversy. McNamara has insisted that he authorized the study to preserve for scholars the governmental documents that chronicled the key decisions resulting in the United States' involvement in the Asian land war. (Rudenstine, 1996)
In October, 1969, some of the documents were allegedly taken without permission by Daniel Ellsberg, a researcher of the documents, and photocopied by Lynda Sinay and Anthony Russo, a researcher who advocated ending the war.
It is reported that Vu Van Thai, South Vietnam ambassador to the United States from 1965 to 1967 was shown part of the document. Ellsberg was one of the 36 researchers assigned to compile a history of the relationship between the United States and Vietnam from 1945.
Daniel Ellsberg received both a masters and doctoral degree in economics from Harvard University. He also studied at the University of Cambridge. Ellsberg worked as a military foreign affairs consultant to the White House in the early 1960s, officially joining the Defense Department in 1964.
On November 6, 1969, Ellsberg revealed the existence of the Pentagon Papers to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fullbright. Ellsberg urged Fullbright to reveal the documents to the public.
On December 20, 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird refused to make the Pentagon Papers available to the public despite arguments by Fullbright.
Fullbright supported the need to reveal the documents to the public, but did not want to be the one to do it.
In January, 1971, Daniel Ellsberg talked to Senator George McGovern about the existence of the documents. Senator McGovern would not accept the documents, but instead advised Ellsberg to take them to the newspapers.
In March, 1971, Daniel Ellsberg gave copies of the documents to Neil Sheehan of The New York Times. The paper struggled for more than three months whether to publish the report and how.
On June 13, 1971, The New York Times finally went to press with the government's secret history of its land war in Southeast Asia.
The story, eagerly anticipated by some and dreaded by others, was more than six pages of new stories and documents based on the fourty-seven-volume study. (Ungar, 1972)
The lead article, described what would come to be known throughout the world as the Pentagon Papers and listed their conclusions: that the administration of President Harry S. Truman directly involved the United States in Indochina by aiding France
in it's colonial war there. ((Ungar, 1972)
They concluded that the Eisenhower administration played a direct role in undermining the Geneva settlement of 1954, that President John F. Kennedy expanded America's involvement into a broad commitment, and that the Johnson administration waged a covert war and planned an overt one long before revealing it to Congress or the public. (Ungar, 1972)
The papers concluded that consistant with the forecasts of governmental intelligence agents the controversial American bombing of North Vietnam was utterly ineffective in relieving pressure on American and South Vietnamese troops. (Ungar,
1972)
Sheehan, [focusing] the first installment on the pivotal period, was leading up to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August, 1964. He described the build-up of a secret provocation strategy and the drafting of a congressional resolution a black check for escalation to be held in reverse. Ungar, 1972)
The story revealed such internal government documents as a brutally frank 1964 memorandum by John T. McNaughton, then Secretary of Defense for Internal Security Affairs, assessing American goals in South Vietnam as 70 percent to avoid a
humilating U. S. defeat, 20 percent to keep SVN [South Vietnam] territory from Chinese hands and 10 percent to permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life. Also, to emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used, not to help a friend friend although it would be had to stay in if asked. (Ungar, 1972)
Publication of the document led to the Nixon adminstration suing The New York Times for prior restraint. On June 14, 1971, The New York Times refused to cease publication, despite a request from Attourney General John Mitchell. The next day a federal district judge issued a temporary injunction against The New York Times
continuing publication.
Two days later, on June 17, 1971, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced that it was looking for Daniel Ellsberg. On June 19, the United States Court of Appeals instructed The Washington Post to cease publication of the Pentagon Papers. The
Washington Post had been publishing excerpts of the documents while The New York Times had been under court order the cease publishing the documents.
Daniel Ellsberg, who had been indicted by a Los Angeles, Ca., grand jury, surrendered to police on June 28, 1971, and admitted to the distribution of the Pentagon Papers to the newspapers.
On June 30, 1971, just fifteen days after the inital publication, the United State Supreme Court ruled that The New York Times and The Washington Post could resume publication of the series.
The decision of seventeen Congressmen to publicly air the Pentagon Papers is an auspicious beginnign marking a long overdue effort to re-establish the basic priniples which our nation has professed for nearly two centuries. Hopefully the first result of this endevor will be to inform the public. (Krause, 1972)
On December 20, 1971, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo were indicted for conspiracy, espionage, theft and misuse of secret documents in Los Angeles, Ca. Ellsberg entered a plea of innocence while Russo refused to plea. Lynda Sinay and Vu Van Thai, who also had a part in copying and distributing the documents were not
indicted, but were named as co-conspiritors. Their trial began January 1973. The case was dismissed in May 1973, due to prosecution irregularities and governmental interferance.
Daniel Ellsberg's revelation of the Pentagon Papers has been described, by himself and others, sometimes as an act of conscience, sometimes as a conscientiou act, sometimes as an important act of disobedience. (French, 1974)
The Pentagon Papers Case of 1971 brought to the forefront three important legal concerns/issues. The first was the government's right to censor the news publications printing the pentagon papers. This defied the right of freedom of speech and press as defined in the First Amendment of the Consititution.
The other two were opposing issues: the publics right to know what governement officials were doing (or the government's duty to inform the public who appointed them) versus the right to secrecy or confidentiality in the interest of national security.

I am continually intriqued by the precidents and laws decided by one particular incident or event, especially in the relationship between the media nad the military. As I continue my research, there will be future posts, some factual, others mere opinions.